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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
Yanbai Andrea Wang (“amicus”) is an assistant 
professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey 
Law School, where she teaches and writes about civil 
procedure and transnational litigation.  Her article, 
Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2089 
(2020) (“Wang”), provides a groundbreaking and 
comprehensive study of the nationwide operation of 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 in lower courts since this Court’s 
2004 decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Medical 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).  She submits this 
amicus curiae brief to offer her academic perspective 
for this Court’s consideration as it addresses the scope 
and application of Section 1782 and the Intel decision. 
 INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rather than expressing a view on the issues raised 
and ably briefed by the parties, amicus submits this 
brief to inform the Court of the extensive scholarly 
research and analysis she has conducted regarding 
Section 1782 proceedings since this Court’s seminal 
decision in Intel.  As the Court itself recognized in 
 
1 All parties have consented in writing to the filing of this brief.  
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  The University 
of Pennsylvania Carey Law School provides financial support for 
activities related to faculty members’ research and scholarship, 
which helped defray the costs of preparing this brief.  (The School 
is not a signatory to the brief, and the views expressed herein are 
those of the amicus curiae.)  Otherwise, no person or entity other 
than the amicus curiae or her counsel has made a monetary 




Intel, over time, it would need to clarify and refine the 
factors set forth in that decision in light of “further 
experience with Section 1782(a) applications in the 
lower courts.”  542 U.S. at 265.  That is precisely the 
experiential evidence that amicus’ scholarship 
provides.  The upshot of that scholarly analysis is that, 
as Section 1782 applications have proliferated, the 
lower courts have struggled to apply the Intel factors 
as this Court had envisioned.  Thus, if the Court rules 
that commercial arbitrations, whether foreign or 
international,2 fall within Section 1782’s ambit, this 
case presents a perfect opportunity for the Court also 
to clarify how lower courts should apply the 
Intel factors in all Section 1782 proceedings. 
Especiallyin the context of Section 1782 
applications submitted by parties to an international 
proceeding (as opposed to those made by the 
international tribunal itself), lower courts have 
frequently found themselves constrained in their 
ability to analyze and apply the Intel factors.  In 
particular, because applicants often do not notify the 
 
2 The amicus notes that the terms “foreign” and “international” 
refer to two separate categories of courts and tribunals.  A 
“foreign” court or tribunal is one located outside the territory of 
the United States and operating within the legal framework of a 
foreign jurisdiction.  An “international” court or tribunal is a 
cross-border institution operating within the framework of 
international law.  An “international” tribunal may be located 
within the territory of the United States and, as such, would not 
be considered “foreign.”  Since the distinction is not significant to 
the points raised in this brief, the terms “international tribunal” 
and “foreign tribunal” are both used as shorthand for the 




international tribunals or the other parties to the 
international proceedings of their application, the 
federal courts tasked with adjudicating those 
applications are unable to conduct an informed 
assessment of the critical Intel factors addressing 
whether the international tribunal is receptive to 
discovery assistance from U.S. courts or whether the 
request is an effort to circumvent discovery 
restrictions in the international proceeding.  That lack 
of information is exacerbated by many courts’ practice 
of placing the burden of proof on the Section 1782 
target who is resisting discovery, rather than the 
applicant.  Typically, the discovery target is a 
nonparty to the international proceeding and is thus 
poorly positioned or completely unable to provide the 
information necessary for the lower court’s 
assessment of the Intel factors. 
These practical problems can be solved by two 
simple clarifications from this Court.  First, the Court 
should clarify that Section 1782 applicants must 
notify in advance the discovery target, all parties, and 
all tribunals involved in the international proceedings 
in which the requested evidence is to be used.  Second, 
the Court should clarify that the Section 1782 
applicant bears the burden of proof to establish that 
the request should be granted under the Intel 
factors.  Both of these requirements are clearly within 
the Court’s authority, and both are fully consistent 
with the Federal Rules’ approach to domestic 
discovery. 
Moreover, those two clarifications would resolve 
many of the policy concerns that appear to animate 
lower court decisions that have excluded international 
commercial arbitrations from Section 1782’s 
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reach.  By ensuring that discovery targets, the 
opposing parties, and the international tribunals are 
notified in advance and have an opportunity to express 
their views on a Section 1782 application, district 
courts will be able to deny those applications where 
the international tribunal itself is not receptive to U.S. 
discovery.  And by placing the burden on the party 
requesting the discovery, the analysis would weed out 
weak or abusive applications that might currently be 
granted simply because some lower courts currently 
place the burden on a nonparty from whom discovery 
is sought—who is in a particularly weak position to 
provide the information required to conduct the 
Intel analysis. 
Ultimately, this approach—of clarifying the Intel 
factors to require notice and properly placing the 
burden on the applicant—is a far preferable way to 
prevent misuse of Section 1782 than drawing an 
artificial and ill-defined line between “public” and 
“private” arbitrations.  Indeed, that line does not 
stand up to the reality of modern international 
arbitration.  On the contrary, because virtually all 
international arbitration is conducted within the 
framework of international treaties or other inter-
governmental agreements, the line between “public” 
and “private” arbitral proceedings is an illusory 
one.  Any effort to articulate such a line would 
illogically exclude many commercial arbitrations from 
Section 1782’s reach while leaving materially 
indistinguishable proceedings—such as investor-state 
arbitrations—within the statute’s bounds.  The more 
logical and practical approach, in light of the years of 





I. As Section 1782’s Use Has Surged, Lower 
Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel’s 
Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful 
Fashion. 
In the years since this Court’s seminal decision in 
Intel, the use of Section 1782 for discovery in aid of 
international proceedings has exploded.  Between 
2005 and 2017, the number of discovery requests 
received nationwide for use in international civil or 
commercial (as opposed to criminal) proceedings 
quadrupled from approximately 50 to 200 annually.  
Wang, 87 U. CHI. L.R. at 2111.  Section 1782 permits 
requests to be made either by “a foreign or 
international tribunal” or by “any interested person.”  
The latter group—a class overwhelmingly consisting 
of parties to the proceeding, but also including other 
persons with participation rights in the proceeding, 
Intel, 542 U.S. at 256-57—has experienced a 
significant surge.3  The lower courts have struggled 
immensely to apply the Intel factors in response to 
such party requests.  If the Court rules that Section 
1782 applies to international commercial arbitrations, 
this case presents a perfect opportunity to refine and 
clarify the Intel factors’ application in all contexts. 
 
3 Fewer than 1% of requests come from “interested persons” who 
are not parties to the underlying proceedings.  Wang, at 2113.  
Accordingly, this brief focuses on requests by “interested 
person[s]” who are parties to the underlying proceedings, or 
“party requests” for short. 
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A. Practical Experience Has Shown That 
The Lower Courts Have Struggled to 
Conduct the Analysis Required by Intel. 
As the use of Section 1782 has expanded, the 
number of requests originating from parties now 
exceeds the number originating from tribunals.  
Wang, 2113-14.  Indeed, party requests have given 
rise to nearly all appeals of Section 1782 decisions in 
the past decade, including each of the decisions 
resulting in the circuit split now before the Court.  See, 
e.g., Servotronics Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689 
(7th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, __S. Ct.__, No. 20-794, 
2021 WL 1072280 (S. Ct. Mar. 22, 2021); Kiobel by 
Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d 
238 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 852 (2019); 
Grupo Mexico SAB de CV v. SAS Asset Recovery, Ltd., 
821 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2016); Suzlon Energy Ltd v 
Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2011).  And 
nearly all the requests linked to international 
commercial arbitrations come from parties. 
Yet, party requests pose unique difficulties for the 
lower courts that are tasked with applying the factors 
set forth in Intel.  Structurally, requests from 
tribunals tend to be straightforward and homogenous.  
Almost all tribunal requests seek discovery for use in 
a single pending litigation before a foreign court, and 
more often than not that litigation concerns a family 
law matter.  Wang, 2115, 2109.  Moreover, when a 
request comes from a tribunal itself, it is self-evident 
that the international tribunal is receptive to U.S. 
discovery assistance, even where the tribunal’s own 
discovery rules differ from those in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, virtually all tribunal 
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requests are granted—approximately 99% in 2015.  
Wang, 2122.  And rightfully so. 
By contrast, party requests derive from a variety 
of different claims, in differing procedural postures, 
within divergent types of international proceedings.  
As a result, it is typically much less clear whether the 
international tribunal is receptive to U.S. discovery 
assistance when a request comes from a party.  In 
some circumstances, party requests raise the specter 
that a party might arbitrage different systems of 
discovery to obtain evidence using Section 1782 that is 
neither needed nor wanted by the tribunal with 
jurisdiction over the dispute.  That is because 
“[d]iscovery in the federal court system is far broader 
than in most (maybe all) foreign countries.” Heraeus 
Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594 (7th 
Cir. 2011); see also National Broadcasting Company, 
Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“Few, if any, non-American tribunals of 
any kind, including arbitration panels created by 
private parties, provide for the kind of discovery that 
is commonplace in our federal courts.”).  
The complexities inherent in party requests often 
make it difficult for lower courts to conduct the 
analysis this Court articulated in Intel.  As the Court 
is aware, it identified the following factors to guide 
lower courts’ consideration of Section 1782 requests: 
• Whether the requested evidence is 
“unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid,” which 
is likely when the target from whom 
discovery is sought is a “nonparticipant[] 
in the foreign proceeding [and] may be 
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outside the foreign tribunal’s 
jurisdictional reach”;  
•  “[T]he nature of the foreign tribunal, the 
character of the proceedings underway 
abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign 
government or the court or agency abroad 
to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; 
• Whether the request “conceals an attempt 
to circumvent foreign proof-gathering 
restrictions or other policies of a foreign 
country or the United States”; and 
• Whether the discovery requested is 
“unduly intrusive or burdensome,” in 
which case the request may be rejected or 
trimmed.   
542 U.S. at 264-65 (citation omitted). 
In the context of party requests, the lower courts 
often have little to no information other than what the 
applicant states in its request.  And under current 
practice, it is unclear who should be informed or have 
participation rights when a district court receives a 
request from a party.  In fact, Section 1782 requests 
are often considered and granted on an ex parte basis, 
without prior notice to the other parties to the 
international proceeding, the tribunal in which the 
evidence is to be used, or the target of the discovery 
request.  See, e.g., Gushlak v. Gushlak, 486 F. App’x 
215, 217 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that “it is neither 
uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant 
applications made pursuant to § 1782 ex parte” and 
listing several examples); Order, Elkind v. CCBill, 
LLC, No. 2:14-mc-00030, *1 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2014) 
(granting ex parte request).  While the target of the 
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discovery request has an opportunity to challenge it 
after the request is granted and the subpoena is 
served, the target is typically a nonparty who may 
have no information about the dispute, the proceeding, 
or the tribunal at issue, and therefore little ability to 
contest the request under the Intel factors.  
Making matters worse, it is currently unclear 
where the burden of proof lies for the Intel factors.  
Some courts place the burden on the applicant.  See, 
e.g., In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 241 
(D. Mass. 2008).  Others place the burden on the target 
resisting discovery.  See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 
F.3d 153, 162 (3d Cir. 2011).  When the burden is 
placed on a nonparty target with no relevant 
information, it is particularly difficult for the court to 
conduct a full Intel analysis. 
B. These Practical Difficulties Have Led 
Some Lower Courts to Dilute the Intel 
Factors. 
The result of these practical difficulties is that the 
Intel factors often do not currently function how this 
Court originally envisioned that they would.  In 
particular, the factors have ceased to serve as effective 
gatekeepers for party requests where the 
international tribunal is not receptive to discovery 
assistance in the United States—in large part because 
lower courts are often left in the dark as to that critical 
factor.  Rather than permit that dysfunction to persist, 
this Court should take this opportunity to clarify and 
refine how the factors are intended to function and 




The two Intel factors concerning an international 
tribunal’s receptivity and the circumvention of proof-
gathering restrictions are often considered in tandem.  
And they are central to ensuring that the statute 
serves the goal of “assist[ing] foreign tribunals in 
obtaining relevant information that the tribunals may 
find useful.”  Intel, at 262.  Applying those critical 
factors requires a range of information that can be 
difficult for district courts to ascertain—including 
whether the requested evidence is relevant to the 
dispute, whether it is foreclosed by the proceeding’s 
governing discovery rules, and whether the tribunal 
would find the evidence useful.  
District courts often have no ability to consider 
these factors in a meaningful way due to information 
omitted from the applicant’s request.  For instance, 
they have struggled to ascertain whether the 
requested discovery is relevant to the dispute,4 the 
scope of discovery permitted in the proceeding at 
issue,5 and whether a similar discovery request has 
already been denied by the international court or 
tribunal.6  Some district courts avoid the question by 
shifting the burden of proof to the target of the Section 
1782 request, requiring the target to provide 
“authoritative proof” that the international tribunal is 
not receptive to U.S. federal district court assistance.  
See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 162 (3d 
 
4 See Order, In re Application of Raoul Malak, No. 2:14-mc-00089, 
*4 (D. Ariz. filed Feb 17, 2015) (Malak Application Order). 
5 See Marubeni America Corp. v. LBA Y.K., 335 F. App’x 95, 97-
98 (2d Cir. 2009). 
6 See In re Chevron, 633 F.3d at 162–63. 
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Cir. 2011); Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995); In re MTS Bank, No. 
17-21545, 2017 WL 3155362, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 
2017).  Especially where the target is not a party to 
the international proceeding, meeting this burden is 
nearly impossible.  And lower courts are now 
conflicted, both between and within circuits, on who 
bears the burden as to the receptivity factor.  See, e.g., 
In re Schlich, 893 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has not established the 
appropriate burden of proof, if any, for any of the 
discretionary factors, or the legal standard required to 
meet that burden” and placing the burden on neither 
party); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 
241 (D. Mass. 2008) (placing the burden on the 
proponent of discovery); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 
1335 (11th Cir. 2007) (placing the burden on neither 
party).  It is thus imperative that this Court provide 
clarity on this issue. 
District courts have also adopted other analytical 
shortcuts that find no support in this Court’s Intel 
decision.  For instance, some courts infer receptivity 
from prior federal court decisions concerning a court 
or tribunal in the same jurisdiction without examining 
how the prior federal court arrived at the decision or 
whether one tribunal’s putative receptivity can be 
imputed to another presiding over a separate 
proceeding.  See, e.g., Order Granting Ex Parte 
Application for Order to Obtain Discovery for Use in 
Foreign Proceedings, In re Ex Parte Application of 
ANZ Commodity Trading Party Ltd., No. 4:17-mc-
80070, *6 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 4, 2017).  Over time, 
this particular shortcut has a troubling one-way-
ratchet effect: as the number of cases granting Section 
12 
 
1782 applications accumulate, it becomes easier for 
district courts to grant new requests based on old ones, 
even if the old requests were incorrectly decided. 
Courts have likewise adopted inaccurate 
shortcuts to assess whether the requested evidence is 
attainable in the absence of Section 1782 assistance.  
For instance, some courts merely ask whether the 
discovery target is a nonparty, assuming that the 
nonparty status of the target means that the sought-
after evidence is unattainable without Section 1782.  
See, e.g., Omnibus Report and Recommendations on 
Motions to Intervene, Vacate, Quash Subpoenas, and 
for Protective Order, In re Application of H.M.B. 
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC 1782 to Conduct 
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No. 1:17-cv-
21459, *17 (S.D. Fla. filed July 2, 2018).  Taking 
advantage of that doctrinal shortcut, many discovery 
requests strategically target a nonparty although the 
same evidence is also held by the opposing party in the 
international proceeding and is potentially 
discoverable through the procedures applicable in that 
proceeding. 
These strategically chosen nonparties include 
American corporate affiliates of the opposing party 
and American law firms that received the requested 
evidence for the purpose of representing the opposing 
party in U.S. proceedings.  See, e.g., Bravo Express 
Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc., 613 
F. App’x 319, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2015) (seeking 
discovery from U.S. targets that had a corporate 
relationship and joint business operations with the 
entities that were party to the underlying proceeding); 
Application for an Order Directing ASML US, Inc. to 
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Respond to Requests for Documents Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1782 For Use in Foreign Proceedings, No. 
1:17-mc-00142, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017) (seeking 
discovery from the wholly owned subsidiary of the 
opposing party in the foreign proceeding); Kiobel by 
Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d 
238, 241 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 852 
(2019) (seeking evidence that was sent to an American 
law firm “solely . . . for the purpose of American 
litigation”) (citation omitted). The target’s nonparty 
status is thus not enough to conclude that the 
international tribunal cannot obtain the requested 
evidence absent Section 1782.7 
II. This Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors 
And Strengthen The Procedure For 
Evaluating Section 1782 Requests. 
If this Court concludes that Section 1782 applies 
to international commercial arbitrations, then it 
should take the opportunity to resolve the practical 
difficulties currently plaguing the lower courts’ 
application of the Intel factors.  Indeed, in Intel itself, 
this Court noted that it might later revisit the factors 
it articulated following “further experience with 
§ 1782(a) applications in the lower courts.”  Intel, 542 
U.S. at 265.  That is precisely what amicus’ detailed 
scholarly research and analysis now provides:  
 
7  In addition, Intel instructed that “unduly intrusive or 
burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.”  542 U.S. at 
265 (citations omitted).  This factor, too, has been weakened over 
time.  Since Intel, courts have held that it is preferable to modify 
a request rather than deny it altogether.  See, e.g., Bravo Express 
Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc., 613 F. App’x 
319, 325 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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evidence from over a decade’s worth of lower court 
experience.  As detailed above, that data reveals an 
urgent need to refine and clarify Intel’s discretionary 
factors.  In particular, if the Intel factors are to play 
the critical gatekeeping role that this Court 
envisioned, they require more active participation 
from international tribunals and opposing parties, as 
well as appropriately placed burdens of proof.  And 
this case is a perfect opportunity to provide that 
necessary clarity to the lower courts. 
A. This Court Should Require Applicants to 
Provide Notice of Section 1782 
Proceedings to All Parties and 
International Tribunals. 
The core problems distorting lower courts’ 
application of the Intel factors stem from the fact that 
the most relevant actors—the parties to the 
international proceeding and the tribunal itself—are 
often absent from Section 1782 proceedings.  As a 
result, the key questions at the heart of the Intel 
factors are often unanswerable.  And the solution is 
remarkably simple: this Court should clarify that 
Section 1782 applicants must timely serve the target 
of discovery, all parties to the proceedings for which 
the evidence is to be used, and all tribunals before 
which the evidence is to be used. 
In fact, a number of lower courts have already 
recognized the critical value that notice can provide.  
Although, under current practice, Section 1782 
applications are often made and granted ex parte, 
there is an emerging practice of lower courts requiring 
notice.  In a handful of cases, district courts have 
ordered applicants to notify the target of the discovery 
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request,8 the adversary against whom the evidence is 
to be used,9 and the international tribunal itself.10  
The natural result has been that those courts have 
been able to conduct the actual analysis that this 
Court set forth in Intel—without having to rely on 
distortive short-cuts or dubious assumptions. 
Moreover, requiring Section 1782 applicants to 
provide notice to all parties is consistent with the 
approach taken in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for domestic discovery.  In particular, Rule 
45(a)(4) mandates that notice and a copy of a nonparty 
subpoena be served on each party to the dispute before 
it can be served on a nonparty target, so that other 
parties have an opportunity to object, to monitor the 
discovery, and to seek access to the information 
produced or make additional discovery requests of 
 
8 See, e.g., Order, In re Application of Halliburton SAS, No. 1:14-
mc-00004, *2 (E.D. Va. filed Feb 4, 2014) (“Halliburton 
Application Order”); In re Ex Parte Application of Apple, Inc, 
Apple Retail Germany GmBh, and Apple Sales International, No. 
3:12-cv00179, *1 (S.D. Cal. filed Feb 1, 2012) (“Apple Application 
Order”); Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should Not Grant 
Ecuadorean Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Expedited 
Service and Enforcement of Subpoenas to Conduct Discovery for 
Use in Foreign Proceeding Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re 
Application of Daniel Carlos Lusitand Yaiguaje, No. 3:11-mc-
80087, *2 (N.D. Cal. filed May 9, 2011) (“Yaiguaje Application 
Order”). 
9 See, e.g., Halliburton Application Order at *2 (ordering that 
applicant provide notice to a number of relevant parties); Apple 
Application Order at *1 (same); Yaiguaje Application Order at *2 
(same). 
10 See, e.g., Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 
of Financial Guaranty Insurance Co v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 
No. 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar 29, 2011). 
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their own.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Rules—2013 Amendment, Note to 
Subdivision (a).  And Rule 30(b)(1) requires similar 
notice in the context of nonparty depositions. 
There is no reason why this Court cannot require 
a similar notice process when federal courts are asked 
to order discovery for use in international proceedings.  
Indeed, some lower courts have explicitly relied on 
Rule 45 in imposing notice requirements in Section 
1782 proceedings.  See, e.g., In re Hornbeam Corp., 722 
F. App’x 7, 10-11 (2d Cir. 2018); Request to File Under 
Seal, In re Application of Lúcia de Araujo Bertolla for 
an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain 
Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No. 1:17-
mc-00284, *1 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 25, 2018).  Other 
courts have relied on other similar grounds to impose 
an analogous requirement.  See, e.g., Order by 
Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato, In re Ex Parte 
Application of Nokia Corp., No. 8:13-mc-00010, *1 
(C.D. Cal. filed May 15, 2013); In re Merck & Co, Inc., 
197 F.R.D. 267, 270–71 (M.D. N.C. 2000).  Ultimately, 
this Court need not directly root a notice requirement 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rather, the 
same inherent power the Court possessed to articulate 
the Intel factors necessarily affords it the authority to 
ensure that those factors are meaningfully and 
accurately applied. 
Experience has shown that such a notice 
requirement is necessary for the effective operation of 
the Intel factors.  In particular, if a federal court is to 
accurately assess an international tribunal’s 
receptivity to U.S. discovery assistance, it is 
imperative that the international tribunal is actually 
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notified that its views would be helpful.  In fact, in the 
domestic discovery context, the Federal Rules 
encourage precisely that form of coordination when a 
second federal judge in a different jurisdiction than 
where the main litigation is being heard is called on to 
adjudicate disputes over a nonparty subpoena.  The 
judge tasked with adjudicating the subpoena is 
encouraged to consult with the judge presiding over 
the main case, since the latter is more familiar with 
the underlying dispute.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2013 
Amendment, Note to Subdivision (f).  In the domestic 
context, motions can also be transferred back to the 
court presiding over the main case so as not to disrupt 
that court’s supervision over the underlying litigation. 
See id.  When the tribunal supervising the proceeding 
is international, such consultation is even more 
critical because the federal district court adjudicating 
the Section 1782 request is unfamiliar not only with 
the underlying case but also with the international 
tribunal’s discovery procedures. 
The Court should also clarify that, once notified, 
international tribunals and other affected parties are 
encouraged to express their views on the Section 1782 
request and the Intel factors.  Surprisingly, lower 
courts have disagreed on this topic.  While 
international tribunals are increasingly participating 
in Section 1782 proceedings, they have occasionally 
been precluded from participating.  See, e.g., 
Memorandum and Order, In re Application of 
Microsoft Corp, No. 1:06-mc-10061, *6 n.4 (D. Mass. 
filed Apr. 17, 2006).  Similarly, district courts have 
debated whether an adverse party in the international 
proceeding has standing to participate in a Section 
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1782 request.  Compare In re Kleimar N.V. v. Benxi 
Iron and Steel America, Ltd., No. 17-cv-01287, 2017 
WL 3386115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017) (“[T]here is 
no question that an entity against whom the discovery 
will be used has standing to challenge an order 
allowing discovery under § 1782.”), with Order, In re 
Application of Chevron, No. 1:10-mc-00001, *1 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 24, 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs 
in the foreign proceeding for which discovery was 
sought, “whose standing in this matter is debatable to 
say the least,” had moved to strike some of the filings 
submitted by the § 1782 applicant, who happened to 
be the defendant in the foreign proceeding). 
B. This Court Should Clarify that Section 
1782 Applicants Bear the Burden of 
Establishing that Their Requests Satisfy 
the Intel Factors. 
In addition, the Court should specify that the 
burden of proof with respect to the Intel analysis falls 
on the Section 1782 applicant, who seeks to enlist the 
federal court’s assistance with discovery for an 
international proceeding.  Here, too, this clarification 
is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and federal law in general.  See Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 (1979) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 49, 
56–58 (2005) (“We therefore begin with the ordinary 
default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to 
prove their claims. . . .  Decisions that place the entire 
burden of persuasion on the opposing party at the 




Most important, the burden should rest with the 
applicant to show that the international tribunal is 
receptive to U.S. discovery assistance and that the 
request is not an attempt to circumvent the tribunal’s 
proof-gathering framework.  Aside from the 
international tribunal itself, the Section 1782 
applicant is in the best position to supply the 
necessary information to assess those factors.  And 
placing the burden on the applicant will only further 
encourage notice to the international tribunal, so that 
it can offer its views directly.  Likewise, the applicant 
is plainly in the best position to establish whether the 
evidence is unattainable without U.S. discovery 
assistance.  At the very least, the Court should clarify 
that it is not sufficient merely to identify the target as 
a nonparty to the international proceeding without 
also establishing that the same evidence is not within 
“the possession, custody, or control” of a party—the 
standard scope of discovery under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), 
34(a)(1), 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
C. Clarifying the Intel Factors Will Reduce 
Abuse of Section 1782 and Strengthen 
the Framework this Court Envisioned. 
By requiring notice and placing the burden of 
persuasion on the applicant, this Court would curtail 
abuse of Section 1782 and ensure that lower courts are 
able to conduct the actual analysis required by Intel.  
In the process, the Court will also resolve the policy 
arguments that some lower courts and parties have 
relied upon to exclude international commercial 
arbitrations from Section 1782’s reach.   
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For requests connected to pending arbitrations 
and litigations, the above changes will better align 
district court decisions with the preferences of the 
international tribunals they are assisting.  Indeed, as 
the European Commission argued in the amicus brief 
it filed in Intel, a district court “can only weigh fairly” 
a foreign or international tribunal’s “complex 
interests . . . in aiding or blocking a Section 1782 
discovery request if it is made aware of those 
interests.”  Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commission of 
the European Communities Supporting Reversal, 
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 02-
572, 2003 WL 23138389, at *17 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 
2003).  But “there is no system for providing it with 
notice of Section 1782 cases in which [a tribunal’s] 
interests are at stake, much less any regular 
procedure through which [the tribunal] might appear 
and make those interests known.”  Id. 
The limited instances in which an international 
tribunal’s interests have been solicited reveal that 
they have diverse preferences that district courts 
cannot easily divine.  For instance, a Swiss arbitrator 
has conveyed nonreceptivity to Section 1782 
discovery, see El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva 
Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App’x 31, 32 (5th 
Cir. 2009), while an Israeli arbitrator has expressed 
receptivity, see In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Minn. 2007).  The arbitral 
tribunal in this very case issued a decision stating its 
preference that U.S. courts in the Northern District of 
Illinois and the District of South Carolina be 
permitted to hear Servotronics’ requests on their 
merits, leaving it to the international tribunal to 
determine whether any material obtained pursuant to 
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the Section 1782 application would subsequently be 
relevant or admissible in the arbitration. See Third 
Interim Award,  In the Matter of an Arbitration Under 
the Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
Between Rolls Royce PLC and Servotronics Inc., No. 
20-mc-00081-JRT-KMM, Dkt. No. 23-1, at 10, 12 (D. 
Minn. filed Mar. 9, 2021).  
Indeed, these clarifications would also address 
some of the policy concerns that feature prominently 
in the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ decisions 
excluding international commercial arbitration from 
Section 1782’s reach.  One such concern is the 
discrepancy between Section 1782, which permits 
parties to invoke the power of federal district courts to 
obtain nonparty evidence, and Section 7 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), which only permits arbitrators 
to do so.  See National Broadcasting Co., 165 F.3d at 
187; Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 
F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999); Servotronics, Inc, 975 
F.3d at 695.  By aligning district court decisions with 
the preferences of arbitrators presiding over tribunals, 
the notice requirement would reduce tension between 
Section 1782 and the FAA.  While Section 1782 need 
not be in perfect unison with the FAA—Intel’s 
rejection of both the foreign discoverability 
requirement and the requirement that the sought-
after discovery be discoverable in an analogous U.S. 
proceeding made such equivalence unnecessary—
harmony among the regimes is clearly preferable. 
Meanwhile, for requests connected to 
contemplated proceedings that have not yet been filed, 
the above clarifications would ensure that Section 
1782 is not misused.  Currently, applicants can 
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circumvent many of the factors in such “contemplated 
requests,” perversely making it easier to obtain 
intrusive discovery for hypothetical claims that have 
not even been initiated.  But requiring applicants to 
notify the relevant international tribunal and 
opposing parties would limit the circumstances in 
which parties seek to enlist federal courts in abusive 
fishing expeditions.  This is certainly the case for 
international commercial arbitrations, because the 
tribunal is typically constituted after the arbitration 
has commenced, and only then does the tribunal set 
the procedures that govern the arbitration.  See 
generally Arif H. Ali, et al., The International 
Arbitration Rulebook:  A Guide to Arbitral Regimes 
(2019).  In fact, with the above clarifications, several 
appellate decisions excluding international 
commercial arbitration from Section 1782’s ambit 
would reach the same outcome without the categorical 
exclusion.  See National Broadcasting Co., 165 F.3d at 
186 (noting that the underlying arbitral proceeding 
was contemplated and the arbitration panel not yet 
appointed); El Paso Corp., 341 F. App’x at 32 (noting 
that the arbitral tribunal had issued an order 
indicating it was not receptive to U.S. discovery). 
III. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To 
Adopting Illusory Distinctions That Would 
Exclude “Private” Commercial Arbitrations 
From Section 1782’s Reach. 
Finally, to the extent that this Court is concerned 
by the policy arguments raised against including 
international commercial arbitrations within Section 
1782’s reach, these critical clarifications are a  
preferable avenue for properly calibrating Section 
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1782’s scope than adopting an illusory distinction for 
“private” commercial arbitration while including other 
arbitrations with similar features. 
In reality, international arbitral tribunals are not 
readily classified as “private” or “governmental” 
because they come in many varieties and rely on 
differing degrees of both state authority and private 
contract.  Virtually all international arbitrations 
function within the frameworks set forth in 
international treaties, other inter-governmental 
agreements, and implementing legislation.  For 
instance, the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (the New York 
Convention), binds over 160 state parties and 
obligates the courts of those countries to recognize and 
enforce international commercial arbitral awards 
rendered in other state parties.  The United States is 
bound by this Convention, which is incorporated into 
U.S. law at Chapter 2 of the FAA. Many countries 
have also adopted, in whole or in part, the Model 
Arbitration Law promulgated by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), which regulates the interaction 
between national courts and international arbitral 
tribunals.  And investor-state arbitrations are 
authorized by bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties that permit the private investors of one 
contracting state to bring claims directly against 
another contracting state. 
Many bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties provide for arbitrations to be brought at the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), which was established under the 
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Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals, March 18, 1965, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159, and operates under the auspices of the 
World Bank.  But some investment treaties also 
specify other international arbitration regimes such 
as the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (excluded from 
Section 1782 by the Second Circuit in National 
Broadcasting Co.) or the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (excluded from 
Section 1782 by the Fifth Circuit in Biedermann). 
Excluding “private” commercial arbitration 
ignores the reality that the distinction between 
“private” and “governmental” arbitral tribunals would 
be exceptionally difficult for lower courts to apply.  As 
one example, when attempting to classify the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC), the Second Circuit recently 
articulated a vague, multi-factor test on top of Intel’s 
existing factors.  To determine whether CIETAC is a 
“private” international arbitration outside the scope of 
Section 1782, the Second Circuit considered “a range 
of factors, including the degree of state affiliation and 
functional independence possessed by the entity, as 
well as the degree to which the parties’ contract 
controls the panel’s jurisdiction.”  In re Guo, 965 F.3d 
96, 107 (2d Cir. 2020).  And the lines are growing ever 
blurrier.  In recent years, the establishment of 
adjudicatory institutions around the world that 
function somewhere between courts and arbitral 
tribunals have further muddied the traditional 
distinction between public and private adjudication.  
See generally Pamela K. Bookman, Arbitral Courts, 61 
Va. J. Int’l L. 161 (2021). 
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For these reasons, the Court should resolve any 
concern with Section 1782’s use within international 
commercial arbitrations by clarifying how lower 
courts should apply the Intel factors, rather than 
adopting a highly fraught and illusory distinction that 
would place “private” or “commercial” arbitration 
entirely outside of Section 1782’s ambit.  Indeed, as 
explained above, requiring notice and placing the 
burden of proof on Section 1782 applicants will restore 
the gatekeeping role that the Intel factors were 
established to play.  And requiring courts to conduct a 
meaningful analysis of those factors will weed out the 
abusive and improper claims that seem to motivate 
lower court decisions that have categorically excluded 
international commercial arbitrations from Section 
1782’s reach.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae 
respectfully urges the Court to clarify the Intel factors 
in light of the extensive experience detailed in amicus’ 
research and scholarly analysis on Section 1782’s 
application in the lower courts. 
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